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(1) a trend toward less committed and more fragile relations between men and
women, and (2) the delayed and less likely transition to parenthood and a sharp re-
ductionofhigher-orderbirths,or,inotherwords,postponementofmarriageandfirst




ber of countries in southern, central and eastern Europe are not only below-replace-
ment, but at or below 1.3 children per women, and thus characterised by what has
been called “lowest-low” fertility (Kohler et al 2002). In a recent overview of part-
nership and parenthood patterns and trends in the 1990s, Billari (2004) argues that
lowfertilityisheretostay.Thismaybethecasebut,ashehasalsoshown,itisnotir-
relevant whether low fertility means 1.2 or 1.5 or 1.8 children per woman. The
long-term consequences of the choices young people make today with regard to
tempo and quantum of fertility can be very different indeed, and they are of crucial
importance for our demographic future. The Second Demographic Transition the-
ory, as currently developed, does not contain any prediction as to how low the Total
FertilityRatecanfallorwhatfactorsmightdeterminethelevelindifferentcountries.
According to the original statement about the Second Demographic Transition
(van de Kaa 1987), a profound shift in norms and attitudes regarding personal rela-
tionships, fertility and thefamilyisthedriving forcebehind thedramaticchangesin
the demographic behaviour of Europeans (or European-origin populations). Ron
Lesthaeghe and his collaborators have convincingly argued for the validity of a re-
cursivemodelwith(1)avalues-basedselectionintoalternativelivingarrangements,
and (2) an event-based values adaptation. The empirical evidence for this comes
mostly from American studies, but there are also some examples from European
countries. Much more work is needed in this area.
Arguing fortheimportanceofvaluesinexplaining demographic trendssincethe
mid-1960sisnottosaythatstructuralfactorsarenotimportant;economicandpoliti-
cal forces of change may in certain specific situations even be more important (or at
least as important) as shifts in norms and attitudes. Moreover, values do not operate
in a social and political vacuum, but depend on current political, economic and de-
mographic contexts. As these contexts change, values are reinforced or weakened.
Thus, on a societal level, values are continuously constructed and reconstructed, in
constant interplay with economic and social circumstances.
The importance of context-specific studies of fertility change is also underlined
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ideas may nevertheless have some relevance for the current debate about the useful-
ness of the Second Demographic Transition theory. According to Szreter, it is per-
ceivedrelativecostsofchildrearingwhichconstitutethecentralvariableinvolvedin
fertility change. This is not a new idea, but one particularly interesting aspect of
Szreter’s framework is his emphasis on the changing meaning over time of mother-
hood, parenthood, childhood and adolescence as important dimensions of the con-
ceptofrelativecosts.Iwouldaddfatherhoodtothislist.Theincreasesindivorceand
cohabitation, crucial aspects of the Second Demographic Transition, seem to have
madethefather-childrelationshipmuchmorecomplexthanwaspreviouslythecase.
Fathersareincreasinglyunlikelytolivewiththeirown,biologicalchildren,butmore
likely to live with other children, i.e., those of their current partner (Goldscheider
2000). At the same time, there are indications that, at least in some countries, more
men today are taking up active parental roles with their children and are involved in
what Crittenden (2001) has called “hands-on fatherhood”.
In his presentation at the recent conference on the Second Demographic Transi-
tion, John Hobcraft argued that low fertility is only transitory—due to the gender
transition working itself through. The time frame here is a bit unclear—how many
generations will it take before the gender transition has “worked itself through”?
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Scandinavian countries, with more egalitarian gen-
derstructuresthanmostothercountries,havebeenmoresuccessfulinstabilisingfer-
tilitylevels.ItisalsosometimesarguedthattheScandinaviancountriesarethemost
advanced in the process of the Second Demographic Transition (some would even
arguethattheyhavecometotheendofit—whateverthatmeans).Recentsurveydata
indicatethatabouttwothirdsofchildlessyoungadultsinSwedendesireafamilysize
of two (and only a few per cent say they want to remain childless). So the two-child
norm appears to remain strong in Sweden—it seems that potential parents are con-
vinced that the emotional satisfaction of parenthood requires two rather than one
child, a distinction which may be of crucial importance for future fertility levels.
Analyses based on the Eurobarometer 2001 show that personal ideal family size
among women aged 20 to 34 varies between 2.5 in Finland, Ireland, France and the
UnitedKingdom,and1.6–1.7inAustriaandGermany(Goldsteinetal2003).Asac-
tual, achieved fertility usually falls below family size ideals, the authors argue that
we may be heading for an emergence of sub-replacement family size ideals in Eu-
rope, in particular in the German-speaking countries. If personal ideals decline, it is
unlikely that we will see a rebound of fertility in the near future.
In my view, one of the shortcomings of the Second Demographic Transition the-
oryisalackofanexplicitgenderperspective.Theimportancetotheindividualofau-
tonomy and self-actualisation is a crucial part of the Second Demographic Transi-
tion, underlying the revolutionary changes that we have witnessed in demographic
behaviour. But autonomy and self-actualisation, and the transition from a bourgeois
family model to a modern, individualistic one, are certainly more revolutionary for
the lives of women, than for the lives of men. This is perhaps implicit in the early
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ticle from 1987), where he observes that “getting married and/or having children
may involve considerable opportunity costs for—most often—the female partner”.
Women’s self-realisation has more far-reaching consequences, I would argue, even
incountrieswithamoreegalitariangenderstructure.PeterMcDonald(2000)hasar-
gued for the need to distinguish between gender equity in individual-level institu-
tions (such as the education system or the labour market) and gender equity in fam-
ily-orientedinstitutions,andIthinkitwouldbeusefultobringsuchconceptsintothe
Second Demographic Transition theory.
McDonald’sgenderequitymodelhassomesimilaritywiththeideasexpressedby
Goldscheider (2000). She concurs with van de Kaa (1987) that the Second Demo-
graphicTransitioninmanywaysisaconsequenceofthefirst,andhasbeenfollowing
initsfootsteps acrosstheadvanced,industrialised world. Goldscheider points tothe
fact that the decline in fertility and mortality (in the first demographic transition)
re-shaped women’s lives, because, with smaller families and longer lives, caring for
theyoungwasnolongerafull-timecareerforthem.Sowomenfollowedmentoem-
ployment outside the home. In virtually all societies, men share much fewer domes-
ticresponsibilitieswiththeirwivesthanwomenshareeconomictaskswithmen.This
asymmetry in role obligations, she argues, has greatly contributed to one crucial as-
pect of the Second Demographic Transition, namely the growth in divorce and co-
habitation. The first half of the gender revolution has meant that women in great
numbers have entered the public spheres of education (especially at higher levels),
employment, and political life; thus, what McDonald calls gender equity in
individual-level institutions has been achieved.
But the gender revolution is incomplete—a second phase is required in which
genderequityinfamily-orientedinstitutionsisaccomplished.Whilethisphaseison
its way in some countries, it remains virtually unknown in others. In this second
phase,itistheattitudes(andthebehaviour)ofyoungmentowardspartnership,child-
bearing and parenting that need to be revised, so that sharing of domestic as well as
economic responsibilities becomes the natural foundation of male-female relation-
ships in the future. In a way, one could view the Second Demographic Transition as
the first phase of the gender revolution; if so, one could envisage a “third demo-
graphic transition”, or a second phase of the second one, in which partnership and
parenthood become strong positive options for both men and women, which would
imply less fragile male-female relationships and the possibility of increasing
fertility levels (although not necessarily to replacement levels).
So I think that the usefulness of the Second Demographic Transition theory
wouldbeenhancedbyastrongergenderperspective.Iwouldalsomakeapleaforthe
need of better data. Macro-level changes in attitudes and their relationship to living
arrangements have been studied using data from the European Value Study (EVS)
which have many limitations, the most important one probably being that sample
size. Nevertheless, EVS offers opportunities to analyse changes in values-orienta-
tion over time in different countries, and I would argue for more such studies, per-
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astheISSP(InternationalSocialSurveyProgramme).Forexample,surveysonFam-
ily and Changing Gender Roles have been carried out in a substantial number of
countriesin1988,1994and2002.Butmostofall,Iwouldarguefortheimplementa-
tion of the Gender and Generation Survey in as many countries as possible. Only
withbetterdatawillwebeabletomakeprogressinunderstandingallthecomplexas-
pects of the Second Demographic Transition as it is currently unfolding itself in
different parts of Europe (and European-origin countries).
To conclude, I am convinced that the Second Demographic Transition theory
contains useful concepts for studying ongoing changes in family formation patterns
in advanced, industrialised countries. However, I would argue that the term itself is
actually somewhat misleading, since the word transition implies a dynamic change
fromonebalancetoanother.Ithinkthatabettertermwouldbea“revolution infam-
ily formation patterns”. But the Second Demographic Transition is such an estab-
lished expression that it will probably continue to be used in the future. A more im-
portantpointisthat,inmyview,thereisplentyofroomforimprovementsofthethe-
ory, most importantly the development of a clear gender perspective. The central
conceptsofautonomyandself-realisationarenotgender-neutral,buthavemarkedly
different meanings—and implications—for men and women.
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